The State
Nature And Forms Of Government
Author: Wilson, Woodrow
Nature And Forms Of Government
1387. Government rests upon Authority and Force. - The essential
characteristic of all government, whatever its form, is authority. There must
in every instance be, on the one hand, governors, and, on the other, those who
are governed. And the authority of governors, directly or indirectly, rests
in all cases ultimately on force. Government, in its last analysis, is
organized force. Not necessarily or invariably organized armed force, but the
will of a few men, of many men, or of a community prepared by organization to
realize its own purposes with reference to the common affairs of the
community. Organized, that is, to rule, to dominate. The machinery of
government necessary to such an organization consists of instrumentalities
fitted to enforce in the conduct of the common affairs of a community the will
of the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign majority.
1388. Not necessarily upon Obvious Force. - This is not, however, to be
interpreted too literally, or too narrowly. The force behind authority must
not be looked for as if it were always to be seen or were always being
exercised. That there is authority lodged with ruler or magistrate is in
every case evident enough; but that that authority rests upon force is not
always a fact upon the surface, and is therefore in one sense not always
practically significant. In the case of any particular government, the force
upon which the authority of its officers rests may never once for generations
together take the shape of armed force. Happily there are in our own day many
governments, and those among the most prominent, which seldom coerce their
subjects, seeming in their tranquil, noiseless operations to run of
themselves. They in a sense operate without the exercise of force. But there
is force behind them none the less because it never shows itself. The better
governments of our day, - those which rest, not upon the armed strength of
governors, but upon the free consent of the governed, - are founded upon
constitutions and laws whose source and sanction are the habit of communities.
The force which they embody is not the force of a dominant dynasty or of a
prevalent minority, but the force of an agreeing majority. And the
overwhelming nature of this force is evident in the fact that the minority
very seldom challenge its exercise. It is latent just because it is understood
to be omnipotent. There is force behind the authority of the elected
magistrate, no less than behind that of the usurping despot, a much greater
force behind the President of the United States than behind the Czar of
Russia. The difference lies in the display of coercive power. Physical force
is the prop of both, though in the one it is the last, while in the other it
is the first, resort.
1389. The Governing Force in Ancient and in Modern Society. - These
elements of authority and force in government are quite plain to be seen in
modern society, even when the constitution of that society is democratic; but
they are not so easily discoverable upon a first view in primitive society.
It is common nowadays when referring to the affairs of the most progressive
nations to speak of 'government by public opinion,' 'government by the popular
voice'; and such phrases possibly describe sufficiently well the full-grown
democratic systems. But no one intends such expressions to conceal the fact
that the majority, which utters 'public opinion,' does not prevail because the
minority are convinced, but because they are outnumbered and have against them
not the 'popular voice' only, but the 'popular power' as well, - that it is
the potential might rather than the wisdom of the majority which gives it its
right to rule. When once majorities have learned to have opinions and to
organize themselves for enforcing them, they rule by virtue of power no less
than do despots with standing armies or concerting minorities dominating
unorganized majorities. But, though it was clearly opinion which ruled in
primitive societies, this conception of the might of majorities hardly seems
to fit our ideas of primitive systems of government. What shall we say of
them in connection with our present analysis of government? They were neither
democracies in which the will of majorities chose the ways of government, nor
despotisms, in which the will of an individual controlled, nor oligarchies, in
which the purposes of a minority prevailed. Where shall we place the force
which lay behind the authority exercised under them? Was the power of the
father in the patriarchal family power of arm, mere domineering strength of
will? What was the force that sustained the authority of the tribal chieftain
or of that chief of chiefs, the king? That authority was not independent of
the consent of those over whom it was exercised; and yet it was not formulated
by that consent. That consent may be said to have been involuntary, inbred.
It was born of the habit of the race. It was congenital. It consisted of a
custom and tradition, moreover, which bound the chief no less than it bound
his subjects. He might no more transgress the unwritten law of the race than
might the humblest of his fellow- tribesmen. He was governed scarcely less
than they were. All were under bondage to strictly prescribed ways of life.
Where, then, lay the force which sanctioned the authority of chief and
sub-chief and father in this society? Not in the will of the ruler: that was
bound by the prescriptions of custom. Not in the popular choice: over that
too the law of custom reigned.
1390. The Force of the Common Will in Ancient Society. - The real
residence of force in such societies as these can be most easily discovered if
we look at them under other circumstances. Nations still under the dominion
of customary law have within historical times been conquered by alien
conquerors; but in no such case did the will of the conqueror have free scope
in regulating the affairs of the conquered. Seldom did it have any scope at
all. The alien throne was maintained by force of arms, and taxes were
mercilessly wrung from the subject populations; but never did the despot
venture to change the customs of the conquered land. Its native laws he no
more dared to touch than would a prince of the dynasty which he had displaced.
He dared not play with the forces latent in the prejudices, the fanaticism of
his subjects. He knew that those forces were volcanic, and that no prop of
armed men could save his throne from overthrow and destruction should they
once break forth. He really had no authority to govern, but only a power to
despoil, - for the idea of government is inseparable from the conception of
legal regulation. If, therefore, in the light of such cases, we conceive the
throne of such a society as occupied by some native prince whose authority
rested upon the laws of his country, it is plain to see that the real force
upon which authority rests under a government so constituted is after all the
force of public opinion, in a sense hardly less vividly real than if we spoke
of a modern democracy. The law inheres in the common will: and it is that law
upon which the authority of the prince is founded. He rules according to the
common will: for that will is, that immemorial custom be inviolably observed.
The force latent in that common will both backs and limits his authority.
1391. Public Opinion, Ancient and Modern. - The fact that the public
opinion of such societies made no deliberate choice of laws or constitutions
need not confuse the analogy between that public opinion and our own. Our own
approval of the government under which we live, though doubtless conscious and
in a way voluntary, is largely hereditary, - is largely an inbred and
inculcated approbation. There is a large amount of mere drift in it.
Conformity to what is established is much the easiest habit in opinion. Our
constructive choice even in our own governments, under which there is no
divine canon against change, is limited to modifications. The generation that
saw our federal system established may have imagined themselves out-of-hand
creators, originators of government; but we of this generation have taken what
was given us, and are not controlled by laws altogether of our own making.
Our constitutional life was made for us long ago. We are like primitive men
in the public opinion which preserves; though unlike them in the public
opinion which alters our institutions. Their stationary common thought
contained the generic forces of government no less than does our own
progressive public thought.
1392. The True Nature of Government. - What, then, in the last analysis,
is the nature of government? If it rests upon authority and force, but upon
authority which depends upon the acquiescence of the general will and upon
force suppressed, latent, withheld except under extraordinary circumstances,
what principle lies behind these phenomena, at the heart of government? The
answer is hidden in the nature of Society itself. Society is in no sense
artificial; it is as truly natural and organic as the individual man himself.
As Aristotle said, man is by nature a social animal; his social function is as
normal with him as is his individual function. Since the family was formed,
he has not been without politics, without political association. Society,
therefore, is compounded of the common habit and is an evolution of
experience, an interlaced growth of tenacious relationships, a compact,
living, organic whole, structural, not mechanical.
1393. Society an Organism, Government an Organ. - Government is merely
the executive organ of society, the organ through which its habit acts,
through which its will becomes operative, through which it adapts itself to
its environment and works out for itself a more effective life. There is
clear reason, therefore, why the disciplinary action of society upon the
individual is exceptional; clear reason also why the power of the despot must
recognize certain ultimate limits and bounds; and clear reason why sudden or
violent changes of government lead to equally violent and often fatal
reactions and revolutions. It is only the exceptional individual who is not
held fast to the common habit of social duty and comity. The despot's power,
like the potter's, is limited by the characteristics of the materials in which
he works, of the society which he manipulates; and change which roughly breaks
with the common thought will lack the sympathy of that thought, will provoke
its opposition, and will inevitably be crushed by that opposition. Society,
like other organisms, can be changed only by evolution, and revolution is the
antipode of evolution. The public order is preserved because order inheres in
the character of society.
1394. The Forms of Government: their Significance. - The forms of
government do not affect the essence of government: the bayonets of the
tyrant, the quick concert and superior force of an organized minority, the
latent force of a self-governed majority, - all these depend upon the organic
character and development of the community. "The obedience of the subject to
the sovereign has its root not in contract but in force, - the force of the
sovereign to punish disobedience"; ^1 but that force must be backed by the
general habit (secs. 1435-1442). The forms of government are, nevertheless,
in every way most important to be observed, for the very reason that they
express the character of government, and indicate its history. They exhibit
the stages of political development, and make clear the necessary constituents
and ordinary purposes of government, historically considered. They
illustrate, too, the sanctions upon which it rests.
[Footnote 1: John Morley, Rousseau, Vol. II., p. 184.]
1395. Aristotle's Analysis of the Forms of Government. - It has been
common for writers on politics in speaking of the several forms of government
to rewrite Aristotle, and it is not easy to depart from the practice. For,
although Aristotle's enumeration was not quite exhaustive, and although his
descriptions will not quite fit modern types of government, his enumeration
still serves as a most excellent frame on which to hang an exposition of the
forms of government, and his descriptions at least furnish points of contrast
between ancient and modern governments by observing which we can the more
clearly understand the latter.
1396. Aristotle considered Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy
(Ochlocracy) the three standard forms of government. The first he defined as
the rule of One, the second as the rule of the Few, the third as the rule of
the Many. ^2 Off against these standard and, so to say, healthful forms he set
their degenerate shapes. Tyranny he conceived to be the degenerate shape of
Monarchy, Oligarchy the degenerate shape of Aristocracy, and Anarchy (or
mob-rule) the degenerate shape of Democracy. His observation of the political
world about him led him to believe that there was in every case a strong, an
almost inevitable, tendency for the pure forms to sink into the degenerate.
[Footnote 2: Not of the absolute majority, as we shall see presently when
contrasting ancient and modern democracy (secs. 1403, 1406).]
1397. The Cycle of Degeneracy and Revolution. - He outlined a cycle of
degeneracies and revolutions through which, as he conceived, every State of
long life was apt to pass. His idea was this. The natural first form of
government for every state would be the rule of a monarch, of the single
strong man with sovereign power. This monarch would usually hand on his
kingdom to his children. They might confidently be expected to forget those
pledges and those views of the public good which had bound and guided him.
Their sovereignty would sink into tyranny. At length their tyranny would meet
its decisive check at some Runnymede. There would be revolt; and the princely
leaders of revolt, taking government into their own hands, would set up an
Aristocracy. But aristocracies, though often public- spirited and just in
their youth, always decline, in their later years, into a dotage of selfish
oligarchy. Oligarchy is even more hateful to civil liberty, is even a graver
hindrance to healthful civil life than tyranny. A class bent upon subserving
only their own interests can devise injustice in greater variety than can a
single despot: and their insolence is always quick to goad the many to hot
revolution. To this revolution succeeds Democracy. But Democracy too has its
old age of degeneracy, - an old age in which it loses its early respect for
law, its first amiability of mutual concession. It breaks out into license
and Anarchy, and none but a Caesar can bring it back to reason and order. The
cycle is completed. The throne is set up again, and a new series of
deteriorations and revolutions begins.
1398. Modern Contrasts to the Aristotelian Forms of Government. - The
confirmations of this view furnished by the history of Europe since the time
of Aristotle have been striking and numerous enough to render it still
oftentimes convenient as a scheme by which to observe the course of political
history even in our own days. But it is still more instructive to contrast
the later facts of political development with this ancient exposition of the
laws of politics. Observe, then, the differences between modern and ancient
types of government, and the likelihood that the historian of the future, if
not of the present and the immediate past, will have to record more
divergencies from the cycle of Aristotle than correspondences with it.
1399. The Modern Absolute Monarchy. - Taking the Russian government of
to-day as a type of the vast absolute Monarchies which have grown up in Europe
since the death of Aristotle, it is evident that the modern monarch, if he be
indeed monarch, has a much deeper and wider reach of power than had the
ancient monarch. The monarch of our day is a Legislator; the ancient monarch
was not. Antique society may be said hardly to have known what legislation
was. Custom was for it the law of public as well as of private life: and
custom could not be enacted. At any rate ancient monarchies were not
legislative. The despot issued edicts, - imperative commands covering
particular cases or affecting particular individuals: the Roman emperors were
among the first to promulgate 'constitutions,' - general rules of law to be
applied universally. The modern despot can do more even than that. He can
regulate by his command public affairs not only but private as well, - can
even upset local custom and bring all his subjects under uniform legislative
control. Nor is he in the least bound to observe his own laws. A word, - and
that his own word, - will set them aside: a word will abolish, a word restore,
them. He is absolute over his subjects not only, - ancient despots were that,
- but over all laws also, - which no ancient despot was.
1400. Of course these statements are meant to be taken with certain
important limitations. The modern despot as well as the ancient is bound by
the habit of his people. He may change laws, but he may not change life as
easily; and the national traditions and national character, the rural and
commercial habit of his kingdom, bind him very absolutely. The limitation is
not often felt by the monarch, simply because he has himself been bred in the
atmosphere of the national life and unconsciously conforms to it (secs.
1435-1442).
1401. The Modern Monarchy usually 'Limited.' - But the present government
of Russia is abnormal in the Europe of to-day, as abnormal as that of the
Turk, - a belated example of those crude forms of politics which the rest of
Europe has outgrown. Turning to the other monarchies of to-day, it is at once
plain that they present the strongest contrast possible to any absolute
monarchy ancient or modern. Almost without exception in Europe, they are
'limited' by the resolutions of a popular parliament. The people have a
distinct and often an imperative voice in the conduct of public affairs.
1402. Is Monarchy now succeeded by Aristocracy? - And what is to be said
of Aristotle's cycle in connection with modern monarchies? Does any one
suppose it possible that when the despotism of the Czar falls it will be
succeeded by an aristocracy; or that when the modified authority of the
emperors of Austria and Germany or the king of Italy still further exchanges
substance for shadow, a limited class will succeed to the reality of power?
Is there any longer any place between Monarchy and Democracy for Aristocracy?
Has it not been crowded out?
1403. English and Ancient Aristocracy contrasted. - Indeed, since the
extension of the franchise in England to the working classes, no example of a
real Aristocracy is left in the modern world. At the beginning of this
century the government of England, called a 'limited monarchy,' was in reality
an Aristocracy. Parliament and the entire administration of the kingdom were
in the hands of the classes having wealth or nobility. The members of the
House of Lords and the Crown together controlled a majority of the seats in
the House of Commons. England was 'represented' by her upper classes almost
exclusively. That Aristocracy has been set aside by the Reform Bills of 1832,
1867, and 1885; but it is worth while to look back to it, in order to contrast
a modern type of Aristocracy with those ancient aristocracies which were
present to the mind of Aristotle. An ancient Aristocracy constituted the
State; the English aristocracy merely controlled the State. Under the widest
citizenship known even to ancient democracy less than half the adult male
subjects of the State shared the franchise. The ancient Democracy itself was
a government by a minority. The ancient Aristocracy was a government by a
still narrower minority; and this narrow minority monopolized office and power
not only, but citizenship as well. There were no citizens but they. They
were the State. Every one else existed for the State, only they were part of
it. In England the case was very different. There the franchise was not
confined to the aristocrats; it was only controlled by them. Nor did the
aristocrats of England consider themselves the whole of the State. They were
quite conscious, - and quite content, - that they had the State virtually in
their possession; but they looked upon themselves as holding it in trust for
the people of Great Britain. Their legislation was in fact class legislation,
oftentimes of a very narrow sort; but they did not think that it was. They
regarded their rule as eminently advantageous to the kingdom; and they
unquestionably had, or tried to have, the real interests of the kingdom at
heart. They led the State, but did not constitute it.
1404. Present and Future Prevalence of Democracy. - If Aristocracy seems
about to disappear, Democracy seems about universally to prevail. Ever since
the rise of popular education in the last century and its vast development
since have assured a thinking weight to the masses of the people everywhere,
the advance of democratic opinion and the spread of democratic institutions
have been most marked and most significant. They have destroyed almost all
pure forms of Monarchy and Aristocracy by introducing into them imperative
forces of popular thought and the concrete institutions of popular
representation; and they promise to reduce politics to a single form by
excluding all other governing forces and institutions but those of a wide
suffrage and a democratic representation, - by reducing all forms of
government to Democracy.
1405. Differences of Form between Ancient and Modern Democracies. - The
differences of form to be observed between ancient and modern Democracies are
wide and important. Ancient Democracies were 'immediate,' while ours are
'mediate,' that is to say, representative. Every citizen of the Athenian
State, - to take that as a type, - had a right to appear and vote in proper
person in the popular assembly, and in those committees of that assembly which
acted as criminal courts; the modern voter votes for a representative who is
to sit for him in the popular chamber, - he himself has not even the right of
entrance there. This idea of representation, - even the idea of a vote by
proxy, - was hardly known to the ancients; but among us it is all-pervading.
Even the elected magistrate of an ancient Democracy was not looked upon as a
representative of his fellow-citizens. He was the State, so far as his
functions went, and so long as his term of office lasted. He could break
through all law or custom, if he dared. It was only when his term had expired
and he was again a private citizen that he could be called to account. There
was no impeachment while in office. To our thought all elected to office, -
whether Presidents, ministers, or legislators, - are representatives. The
limitations as to the size of the State involved in ancient practices and
conceptions is obvious. A State in which all citizens are also legislators
must be necessity be small. The modern representative State has no such
limitation. It may cover a continent.
1406. Nature of Democracy, Ancient and Modern. - The differences of
nature to be observed between ancient and modern Democracies are no less wide
and important. The ancient Democracy was a class government. As already
pointed out, it was only a broader Aristocracy. Its franchise was at widest
an exclusive privilege, extending only to a minority. There were slaves under
its heel; there were even freedmen who could never hope to enter its
citizenship. Class subordination was of the essence of its constitution.
From the modern Democratic State, on the other hand, both slavery and class
subordination are excluded as inconsistent with its theory, not only, but,
more than that, as antagonistic to its very being. Its citizenship is as wide
as its native population; its suffrage as wide as its qualified citizenship, -
it knows no non-citizen class. And there is still another difference between
the Democracy of Aristotle and the Democracy of Tocqueville and Bentham. The
citizens of the former lived for the State; the citizen of the latter lives
for himself, and the State is for him. The modern Democratic State exists for
the sake of the individual; the individual, in Greek conception, lived for the
State. The ancient State recognized no personal rights, - all rights were
State rights; the modern State recognizes no State rights which are
independent of personal rights.
1407. Growth of the Democratic Idea. - In making the last statement
embrace 'the ancient State' irrespective of kind and 'the modern State,' of
whatever form, I have pointed out what may be taken as the cardinal difference
between all the ancient forms of government and all the modern. It is a
difference which I have already stated in another way. The democratic idea
has penetrated more or less deeply all the advanced systems of government, and
has penetrated them in consequence of that change of thought which has given
to the individual an importance quite independent of his membership of a
State. I can here only indicate the historical steps of that change of
thought; I cannot go at any length into its causes.
1408. Subordination of the Individual in the Ancient State. - We have
seen that, in the history of political society, if we have read that history
aright, the rights of government, - the magistracies and subordinations of
kinship, - antedate what we now call the rights of the individual. A man was
at first nobody in himself; he was only the kinsman of somebody else. The
father himself, or the chief, commanded only because of priority in kinship:
to that all rights of all men were relative. Society was the unit; the
individual the fraction. Man existed for society. He was all his life long
in tutelage; only society was old enough to take charge of itself. The State
was the only Individual.
1409. Individualism of Christianity and Teutonic Institutions. - There
was no essential change in this idea for centuries. Through all the
developments of government down to the time of the rise of the Roman Empire
the State continued, in the conception of the western nations at least, to
eclipse the individual. Private rights had no standing as against the State.
Subsequently many influences combined to break in upon this immemorial
conception. Chief among these influences were Christianity and the
institutions of the German conquerors of the fifth century. Christianity gave
each man a magistracy over himself by insisting upon his personal, individual
responsibility to God. For right living, at any rate, each man was to have
only his own conscience as a guide. In these deepest matters there must be
for the Christian an individuality which no claim of his State upon him could
rightfully be suffered to infringe. The German nations brought into the
Romanized and partially Christianized world of the fifth century an
individuality of another sort, - the idea of allegiance to individuals (sec.
293). Perhaps their idea that each man had a money-value which must be paid
by any one who might slay him also contributed to the process of making men
units instead of State fractions; but their idea of personal allegiance played
the more prominent part in the transformation of society which resulted from
their western conquests. The Roman knew no allegiance save allegiance to his
State. He swore fealty to his imperator as to an embodiment of that State,
not as to an individual. The Teuton, on the other hand, bound himself to his
leader by a bond of personal service which the Roman either could not
understand or understood only to despise. There were, therefore, individuals
in the German State: great chiefs or warriors with a following (comitatus) of
devoted volunteers ready to die for them in frays not directed by the State,
but of their own provoking (secs. 291-293). There was with all German tribes
freedom of individual movement and combination within the ranks, - a wide play
of individual initiative. When the German settled down as master amongst the
Romanized populations of western and southern Europe, his thought was led
captive by the conceptions of the Roman law, as all subsequent thought that
has known it has been, and his habits were much modified by those of his new
subjects; but this strong element of individualism was not destroyed by the
contact. It lived to constitute one of the chief features of the Feudal
System.
1410. The Transitional Feudal System. - The Feudal System was made up of
elaborate gradations of personal allegiance. The only State possible under
that system was a disintegrate state embracing, not a unified people, but a
nation atomized into its individual elements. A king there might be, but he
was lord, not of his people, but of his barons. He was himself a baron also,
and as such had many a direct subject pledged to serve him; but as king the
barons were his only direct subjects; and the barons were heedful of their
allegiance to him only when he could make it to their interest to be so, or
their peril not to be. They were the kings of the people, who owed direct
allegiance to them alone, and to the king only through them. Kingdoms were
only greater baronies, baronies lesser kingdoms. One small part of the people
served one baron, another part served another baron. As a whole they served
no one master. They were not a whole: they were jarring, disconnected
segments of a nation. Every man had his own lord, and antagonized every one
who had not the same lord as he (secs. 304-313).
1411. Rise of the Modern State. - Such a system was fatal to peace and
good government, but it cleared the way for the rise of the modern State by
utterly destroying the old conceptions. The State of the ancients had been an
entity in itself, - an entity to which the entity of the individual was
altogether subordinate. The Feudal State was merely an aggregation of
individuals, - a loose bundle of separated series of men knowing few common
aims or actions. It not only had no actual unity: it had no thought of unity.
National unity came at last, - in France, for instance, by the subjugation of
the barons by the king (sec. 323); in England by the joint effort of people
and barons against the throne, - but when it came it was the ancient unity
with a difference. Men were no longer State fractions; they had become State
integers. The State seemed less like a natural organism and more like a
deliberately organized association. Personal allegiance to kings had
everywhere taken the place of native membership of a body politic. Men were
now subjects, not citizens.
1412. Renaissance and Reformation. - Presently came the thirteenth
century with its wonders of personal adventure and individual enterprise in
discovery, piracy, and trade. Following hard upon these, the Renaissance woke
men to a philosophical study of their surroundings, - and above all of their
long-time unquestioned systems of thought. Then arose Luther to reiterate the
almost forgotten truths of the individuality of men's consciences, the right
of individual judgment. Ere long the new thoughts had penetrated to the
masses of the people. Reformers had begun to cast aside their scholastic
weapons and come down to the common folk about them, talking their own vulgar
tongue and craving their acquiescence in the new doctrines of deliverance from
mental and spiritual bondage to Pope or Schoolman. National literatures were
born. Thought had broken away from its exclusion in cloisters and
universities and had gone out to challenge the people to a use of their own
minds. By using their minds, the people gradually put away the childish
things of their days of ignorance, and began to claim a part in affairs.
Finally, systematized popular education has completed the story. Nations are
growing up into manhood. Peoples are becoming old enough to govern
themselves.
1413. The Modern Force of Majorities. - It is thus no accident, but the
outcome of great permanent causes, that there is no more to be found among the
civilized races of Europe any satisfactory example of Aristotle's Monarchies
and Aristocracies. The force of modern governments is not now often the force
of minorities. It is getting to be more and more the force of majorities.
The sanction of every rule not founded upon sheer military despotism is the
consent of a thinking people. Military despotisms are now seen to be
necessarily ephemeral. Only monarchs who are revered as seeking to serve
their subjects are any longer safe upon their thrones. Monarchies exist only
by democratic consent.
1414. New Character of Society. - And, more than that, the result has
been to give to society a new integration. The common habit is now operative
again, not in acquiescence and submission merely, but in initiative and
progress as well. Society is not the organism it once was, - its members are
given freer play, fuller opportunity for origination; but its organic
character is again prominent. It is the Whole which has emerged from the
disintegration of feudalism and the specialization of absolute monarchy. The
Whole, too, has become self- conscious, and by becoming self-directive has set
out upon a new course of development.
