A New Civilization Emerges in Western Europe
Edited By: R. A. Guisepi
The Sources Of Vitality In The Postclassical West
Why did western Europe begin to demonstrate new vigor around A.D. 1000 -
forming new schools and a more elaborate culture; expanding trade and towns,
while loosening the most restrictive aspects of manorial social organization;
launching new, sometimes aggressive contacts with other areas, as in the
Crusades? The question is really the reverse of the more familiar analysis of
societal decline. It is at least as important to know what causes
civilizations to rise as to probe the reasons for their fall. At various
points in history (including the 20th century) certain societies begin to be
more dynamic than they had been before, sometimes more dynamic also than many
other societies in the same period. Determining causes in one case may help in
evaluating other cases. Furthermore, an understanding of causes may help
explain directions of new vigor - what kinds of new cultural forms are
generated, for example, or why some dynamic societies are more expansionistic
than others. The causes that produced new energy in the medieval West are
particularly interesting in that they galvanized not only a backward society,
but one that in some respects - in levels of trade and learning, for instance
- had retrogressed from previous achievements.
The legacy of Greece and Rome had something to do with the medieval
surge. Key Europeans knew the empire had existed; a sense of lost greatness
might have inspired them. More concretely, revival of specific political
achievements like Roman law helped stabilize medieval politics by the 11th
century, starting with the organization of the Church itself. Continued use of
Latin for intellectual life facilitated encounters with classical learning.
One approach to an explanation, then, might suggest a certain inevitability:
Classical achievements were so inspiring that, after a few centuries of chaos,
the West almost automatically resurrected key elements of the Greco-Roman
experience. By the 12th century medieval writers suggested this pattern,
arguing that though they could not rival the sheer intellectual power of the
classical philosophers, they actually could forge beyond them by "standing on
their shoulders." This model would suggest a Western experience similar to
that of China after its centuries of chaos subsequent to the fall of the Han
dynasty, for here new vigor was based directly on the ability to revive past
strengths.
Another model for the West stresses the impact of cultural change,
notably the results of conversions to Christianity. To be sure, Christianity
incorporated elements of classical learning and the institutional patterns of
the Roman Empire, but it was in many ways a new force. It took some time for
Christianity to be assimilated, but ultimately it began to reshape habits in
important ways. Thus Christian pleas for peace, while they did not end war in
Europe, did have a taming effect, allowing more stable political structures to
develop by around A.D. 1000. The example of the Church as a bureaucratic
institution similarly helped inspire secular rulers to improve their
administrations, while the interest in reading and interpreting the Bible and
the writings of the church fathers spurred medieval intellectual and
educational life. Some scholars have even argued for a special, unanticipated
technological result of assimilation of Christianity. By arguing that
humankind is superior to the animal world - made in God's image - the new
religion encouraged medieval people toward a less reverent, more utilitarian
view of nature as something to be exploited. It prepared medieval Europeans'
receptivity to new technologies that would subdue nature. More specifically,
Christian interst in bells, for use in church celebrations, stimulated
medieval interest in metalworking, with results that were applied to other
fields by the 15th centurey. Development of clocks, a major technological
advance, followed from an interest in timing the start of religious services.
Certainly Christianity encouraged some of the expansionist tone of a more
dynamic western Europe, as part of a desire to convert unbelievers and beat
back the infidel.
A third line of explanation stresses more purely technological factors.
Moldboard plows began to spread in northwestern Europe by the 9th century,
though they had been introduced earlier by Celtic or Germanic farmers. The
moldboards worked much better in the moist, clinging soil of northern Europe
than the lighter models the Romans had used. The moldboard in turn encouraged
better ironwork and also improved village organization, for the new plows were
costly and required cooperation. At the same time food production improved,
spurring population growth, the rise of cities, and the important push into
sparsely populated lands in eastern Germany.
A second innovation, again taking shape by the 9th and 10th centuries,
was the new collar that allowed harnessing and shoeing of horses instead of
oxen for field work - horses being notably faster in their work. Use of horses
also encouraged land transport and roads. Finally, European farmers began to
convert to the three-field system (in which a third of the land was left
fallow, to replenish fertility, each year) instead of the Roman two-field
system - again a clear basis for rising food production. What was happening -
in advance of new political and cultural forms, bigger cities, and growing
trade - was a quiet agricultural revolution, accomplished by nameless farmers.
Perhaps Christian beliefs about nature inspired them to an extent. Certainly
contact with other people helped - thus in Charlemagne's time, Europeans
learned about horseshoes and stirrups from invaders from central Asia. But it
was the technological thrust that directly set other, more dramatic signs of
dynamism in motion, such as the growth of cities and the creation of
universities.
Western Europe was not of course the only dynamic new society to emerge
in the later centuries of the post classical era. Russia, parts of Africa,
Japan, and other areas showed vigor as well, and in some of the same ways,
such as with more stable politics and commercial expansion. Whatever the
specific combination of factors operating in western Europe, it is important
to remember the larger typology: A number of societies were able to blend
their own cultural traditions and the advantages of new contacts with more
extablished centers of civilization to produce various kinds of growth and
innovation. The motivation of trying to catch up with the richer centers,
along with sufficient contacts to allow some hope of figuring out how to
advance, played no small role in this general process.
Conclusion: The Postclassical West And Its Heritage
The term Middle Ages long suggested a rather unpleasant, backward period
in Western history between the glories of classical Greece and Rome and the
return of vigorous civilization in the 15th century. In this view, the Middle
Ages might be regarded as an unfortunate interlude in which Westerners were
dominated by poverty and superstition, pulled away from mainstream Western
values. Western leaders might be given credit for keeping a few classical
ideals alive, copying documents and venerating the glories of the past.
Western leaders, however, should be given credit for little else.
The harsh view of the Middle Ages is not entirely wrong, though it
neglects the extent to which much activity centered in parts of Europe that
had never before been integrated into a major civilization and therefore were
building appropriate institutions and culture for the first time.
Postclassical Europe was backward in some respects, even at its height. It did
not participate in world contacts as an equal to the great Asian societies.
The Middle Ages was not simply an awkward interlude in Western history,
however. It had a formative force of its own.
The Distinctive Flavor
In culture, medieval thinkers did recapture and repackage key elements of
the classical heritage, particularly in their view of humanity's rational
powers and their definition of reason in terms of logic. By linking classical
rationalism with a strong belief in a divine plan they may indeed have
advanced the idea of a fundamentally orderly universe and so set the stage for
further advances in rationalistic scientific thought. Stylistically, medieval
artists did not mainly work in classical modes, and their contributions added
important ingredients to the larger cultural heritage. William Shakespeare,
for example, writing in the later 16th century, borrowed freely from Greek
literary themes, but he owed still more to the earthy popular drama that began
in the Middle Ages.
In politics, the Middle Ages largely bypassed the classical heritage,
despite a few longings for empire and the important usage of principles of
Roman law. The most characteristic institutions were built on the Church and
feudalism, and their heritage to later Western political developments was
almost certainly greater than that of Greece or Rome. Medieval politics were
not of course the final Western form, but in ideas of higher law and in the
institutional restraints on central government they did prefigure values and
institutions that have had enduring impact in the West. Similarly, medieval
economics, with the new interest in merchant life and technical innovation
that developed by the 10th century, set a much more direct stage for
subsequent Western developments than classical economic patterns had done;
here too, medieval developments were quite different from their Greek and
Roman analogues, as was evident from the greater prestige of merchants and the
absence of extensive slavery.
The Middle Ages, in sum, created its own culture, relying only in part on
earlier classical models. Preservation of classical patterns was important,
and Western leaders would later select a larger number of Greek and Roman
ingredients to challenge certain medieval impulses. Medieval precedents would
remain strong as well, even for periods in which Western pacesetters professed
to scorn the Middle Ages. One world historian has suggested that a key
historical source of Western vitality in more modern centuries has been the
ability to select among a quite diverse set of pasts, rather than building,
Chinese-fashion, upon more unified traditions. Certainly, the Middle Ages
contributed greatly to the range of options available for later Western
development, even as specifically medieval syntheses began to unravel by the
14th century.
Western Civilization In The Postclassical Period: A Comparative Balance Sheet
The Middle Ages formed a distinctive period in Western history while
contributing durable values for the civilization later on. Parliamentary
institutions are one example of heritage, even though their medieval form
differed considerably from their more modern guise.
Postclassical Europe can also be compared with other societies in a
number of developmental respects. Growing complexity over time brought
tensions between the merchant spirit and older agricultural values, which
other civilizations had faced before; it also brought some familiar changes in
the conditions of women. Conversion to Christianity had features that
resembled conversion to Islam elsewhere, though Christian religious
institutions differed considerably from Muslim institutions. Christian and
Muslim thinkers shared problems in coming to terms with other intellectual
traditions, though ultimately the balance struck turned out to differ. On
another front, as feudal monarchies developed more specialized bureaucracies
they unwittingly duplicated elements pioneered much earlier by Chinese rulers,
and they copied contemporary bureaucracies they learned about in the Byzantine
Empire and Muslim Spain.
The most important comparisons involve juxtaposing western Europe with
other areas where civilization was partially novel in this period and where
change was correspondingly rapid. Divided political rule in Europe resembled
conditions in African regions and, even more obviously, in Japan, the only
other feudal society in this period. Rapidly growing trade and an orientation
toward richer, more established centers was another common feature, shared
also with Russia's north-south links. The West's contact levels were higher
than those of most of sub-Saharan Africa, however, and its expansionist
interests - witness the crusades - were much greater than Japan's. Again, the
postclassical West constituted a type of civilization with many similarities
to other emerging regions but with its own distinctive combinations, including
the aggressive interest in the wider world.
ut most people operated according to quite
different economic values, directed toward group welfare rather than
individual profit. This was not either a static society or an early model of a
modern commercial society. It had its own flavor, and its own tensions - the
fruit of several centuries of economic and social change.
Women And Family Life
The increasing complexity of medieval social and economic life may have
had one final effect which is familiar from patterns in other agricultural
societies: setting new limits on the conditions of women. Women's work
remained of course vital in most families. Christian emphasis on the equality
of all souls, and the practical importance of monastic groups organized for
women, giving some an alternative to marriage, continued to offer distinctive
features for women's lives in Western society. The veneration of Mary and
other female religious figures gave women real cultural prestige,
counterbalancing the Biblical emphasis on Eve as the source of human sin. In
some respects women in the West had higher status than their sisters under
Islam: They were less segregated in religious services (though they could not
lead them) and less confined to the household. Still, women's effective voice
in the family may have declined in the Middle Ages. Urban women often played
important roles in local commerce and even operated some craft guilds, but
they found themselves increasingly hemmed in by male-dominated organizations.
By the late Middle Ages a literature arose that stressed women's roles as the
assistants and comforters to men, listing supplemental household tasks and
docile virtues as women's distinctive sphere. Patriarchal structures seemed to
be taking deeper root.
The Political Values Of The Middle Ages
The key values and tensions of medieval society and culture were
expressed in characteristic styles and institutions: the Gothic cathedral, the
scholastic Summas, the manors, and the guilds. Medieval politics produced a
similar summary expression in the feudal monarchy as it flowered during the
High Middle Ages. There was, to be sure, greater basic diversity in medieval
politics than in social or cultural forms, and feudal monarchy by no means
took hold universally across Western society. However, some of the principles
this institution captured were more widely held, wherever feudalism evolved to
permit somewhat more centralized governing structures, in duchies or other
regional states as well as the more eye-catching kingdoms like England and
France.
In addition to its unusual, sometimes overwhelming chaos, the early
postclassical West developed a number of implicit political principles that
were carried over, though also modified, when more sophisticated government
structures began to emerge with the rise of monarchies. Principle number one,
clearly articulated in Church writings, held that laws of God were superior to
those of humans. The Church, as an instrument of God, was separate from the
state and in some ways above it, even though in the rough and tumble of actual
medieval politics secular rulers often seized the upper hand. Principle number
two involved the ineradicable local and regional divisions. Effective imperial
governments could not be formed, as the collapse of Charlemagne's empire
demonstrated; the West would be politically divided. Even regional governments
had to recognize the strength of the local interests and power clusters.
Principle number three, closely related to the impediments to centralization,
involved the values embodied in feudalism. Feudal bonds - the relationships
between lords and vassals - stressed mutuality. Each party in the relationship
should contribute, each should gain. Vassals received protection and, usually,
land (the fief or feudum, from which feudalism took its name) from their lord;
lords won some payments, military service, and loyalty from their vassals.
While feudalism permitted hierarchy among lords, it did not permit, at least
in theory, unilateral assertions of power. It also encouraged mutual
consultation. Vassals were supposed to advise their lords on judicial matters
or issues of policy; lords were supposed to consult their vassals, rather than
acting arbitrarily.
Unadulterated feudalism might of course function very badly. For all the
high-sounding principles, there was a great deal of outright bullying and
power display among the local lords during the postclassical period, quite
apart from ill treatment of the masses of ordinary serfs who were underneath
the feudal system. Effective government required some modifications of
feudalism. Yet feudalism could be blended with other political systems,
without losing many of its distinctive features.
Monarchy And Its Limits
The new ingredient in medieval politics, as medieval society developed
greater vigor from the 10th century onward, was of course the growth of royal
power (or in some regions such as much of present-day Belgium, ducal power).
Here the key steps are in many ways familiar, for they duplicateo,
unwittingly, the centralization principles developed earlier and more
extensively in China and elsewhere. Medieval kings followed particular
patterns of alliances and gradual aggrandizement because of their initially
weak positions, and there were important specific events involved such as the
Norman Conquest of England. Centralization is centralization, however, and
though often reinvented it has some standard features.
Thus, as they began to expand their resources and aspirations, medieval
kings developed small armies of their own, paid for by lands under their
direct control, and they ventured a small central bureaucracy. Often they
chose urban business or professional people to serve in this bureaucracy,
partly because such people had expertise in financial matters and partly
because, unlike the aristocracy, they would owe allegiance to the crown alone.
French and English monarchs began to introduce bureaucratic specialties, so
that some of their ministers would handle justice, others finance, and still
others military matters. They found ways to send centrally appointed
emissaries to the provinces to supervise tax collection and the administration
of justice. It was in this vein that English kings, from the Norman Conquest
onward, appointed local sheriffs to oversee the administration of justice.
None of these activities gave the monarchs extensive contacts with ordinary
subjects; for most people, effective governments were still local. Once the
principle of central control was established, however, a steady growth of
state-sponsored rule followed. By the end of the Middle Ages, monarchs were
gaining the right to tax their subjects directly, and they were beginning to
recruit professional armies, instead of relying solely on an aristocratic
cavalry whose loyalties depended on feudal bonds or alliances. Several
medieval kings, such as Louis IX in France, also gained solid reputations as
law givers, which allowed a gradual centralization of legal codes and court
systems. Rediscovery of Roman law in countries like France encouraged this
centralization effort.
Feudal monarchy was always a delicately balanced institution, of which
the central government formed only one of the key ingredients. The power of
the Church served to check royal ambitions. As we have seen, the Church could
often win in a clash with the state by excommunicating rulers and thus
threatening to turn the loyalties of the population against them. Although the
Church entered a period of decline at the end of the Middle Ages, the
principle was rather clearly established that there were areas of belief and
morality not open to manipulation by the state. And during most of the Middle
Ages, the sheer authority of church organization and religious doctrine made
this limitation on royal power a telling reality.
The second limitation on the royal families came from the traditions of
feudalism and from the landed aristocracy as a powerful class. Aristocrats
tended to resist too much monarchical control in the West, and they had the
strength to make their objections heard. These aristocrats, even when vassals
of the king, had their own economic base and their own military force -
sometimes, in the case of great nobles, they had an army greater than that of
the king. The growth of the monarchy cut into aristocratic power, but this led
to new statements of the limits of kings. In 1215 the unpopular English king
John faced opposition to his taxation measures from an alliance of nobles,
townspeople, and church officials. Defeated in his war with France and then
forced down by the leading English lords, John was forced to sign the Great
Charter, or Magna Carta, which confirmed basically feudal rights against
monarchical claims. John promised to observe restraint in his dealings with
the nobles and the Church, agreeing for example not to institute new taxes
without the lords' permission or to appoint bishops without the Church's
permission. A few modern-sounding references to general rights of the English
people against the state that were included in Magna Carta largely served to
show where the feudal idea of mutual limits and obligations between rulers and
ruled could later expand.
This same feudal balance led, late in the 13th century, to the creation
of parliaments as bodies representing not individual voters but privileged
groups such as the nobles and the Church. The first full English parliament
convened in 1265, with the House of Lords representing the nobles and the
church hierarchy, and the Commons made up of elected representatives from
wealthy citizens of the towns. The parliament institutionalized the feudal
principle that monarchs should consult with their vassals. In particular,
parliaments gained the right to rule on any proposed changes in taxation;
through this power, they could also advise the crown on other policy issues.
While the parliamentary tradition became strongest in England, similar
institutions arose in France, Spain, and several of the regional governments
in Germany. Here too, parliaments represented the key estates: Church, nobles,
and urban leaders. They were not widely elected.
Feudal government was not modern government. People had rights according
to the estate into which they were born; there was no general concept of
citizenship and no democracy. Thus parliaments represented only a minority,
and even this minority only in terms of the three or four estates voting as
units (nobles, clergy, urban merchants, and sometimes wealthy peasants), not
some generalized collection of voters. Still, by creating a concept of limited
government and some hint of representative institutions, Western feudal
monarchy produced the beginnings of a distinctive political tradition. This
tradition differed from the political results of Japanese feudalism, which
emphasized group loyalty more than checks on central power.
During the postclassical period, a key result of the establishment of
feudal monarchy was a comparatively weak central core; although several
monarchies gained ground steadily, they wielded very few general powers. This
would change, as kings attained far more extensive powers in military affairs,
cultural patronage, and the like. However, some solid remnants of medieval
traditions, embodied in institutions like parliaments and ideas like the
separation between God's authority and state power, would define a basic
thread in the Western political process even in the later 20th century.
