In seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, a great deal of emphasis began to be placed upon reason as the primary criterion to be used in the determination of truth. Prior to this time, revelation, as given to us in the Scriptures, was considered to be the means by which truth was determined.
Especially during the time of the Enlightenment, there was a widespread denial of the need for the grace of God in guiding human thought, and a dismissal of revelation, which came to be considered inconsequential in the acquisition of knowledge. It was not necessary for God to give revelation, since, through reason, human beings could discover what was true. Rationalism of this kind characterized the approach of such people as Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), G. W. Liebniz (1646-1716), and Blaise Pascal (1623-62), all of whom were extremely influential in spreading this methodology just prior to the Enlightenment.
Empiricism (or the belief in the primacy of either experience or observation in determining truth) was the approach taken by John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-76). Here again, the source of knowledge is not revelation, but human experience. The Empiricists were also very influential in spreading their ideas.
One of the central questions of philosophy is the epistemological question: how do we know what is true? Is it by the use of reason unaided by revelation that we can make a determination of truth? Is it by observation, or experience? Or is it by revelation from God? If it is by revelation, then we are taking a theocentric approach. If it is by human reason or human experience, then, our approach is anthropocentric or humanistic. Thus, by definition, humanism entails the denial of revelation for the determination of truth.
The Reformers of the sixteenth century took for granted the primacy of God's word in the determination of truth. Martin Luther, for example, dismissed the authority of Aristotle in favor of Biblical revelation.1 He adhered to the Augustinian epistemology, which he described as follows:
Rather, as Augustine says elsewhere, the mind is so laid hold of by the truth itself, that, by virtue of that truth, it is able to reach certainty in any judgment. Nevertheless, the mind is unable to judge the truth as such, although it is compelled to say, when entirely confident, This is true. For example, the mind declares with infallible assurance that three and seven make ten, and yet it cannot adduce any reason why that is true, although it cannot deny its truth. The fact is that, rather than being itself the judge, the mind has been taken captive, and has accepted a verdict pronounced by the Truth herself sitting on the tribunal. Similarly by the illumination of the Spirit, when doctrines come up for decision and approval, the church possesses a "sense" whose presence is certain, though it cannot be proved.2
Luther affirmed the Augustinian epistemology, according to which "the mind is unable to judge the truth," unless assisted by God, through His word and His Spirit. This viewpoint was overthrown during the time of the Enlightenment, when such ideas were increasingly relegated to the status of superstition.
If the Biblical claims are valid, then the Bible's authority must reign supreme if there are apparent conflicts between its statements and that which has been determined on the basis of reason, experience, or observation.
1 Martin Luther, The Pagan Servitude of the Church, in John Dillenberger, Martin Luther: Selections From His Writings (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1961), pp. 268-269.
2 Ibid., p. 341.
