Twentieth-century philosophers usually consider David Hume's essay, "Of Miracles," to have dealt the decisive death-blow to any belief either in the supernatural or in the miracles of the Bible. This essay appears as the tenth section of Hume's treatise, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, originally published in 1748.
He argues as follows:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. . . . But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. . . . There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle1
In stating that the raising of a dead man "has never been observed in any age or country," Hume is begging the question. Has such a thing never been observed in any age or country? He is assuming that it has not ever been observed. What if it has been observed?
Hume's argument is based upon the presupposition of a complete uniformity of natural causes. However, such an assumption is not even consistent with his theory of knowledge, according to which "all effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes."2 According to Hume, there is no necessary connection between a cause and its supposed effect; we infer that there is such a connection on the basis of repeated observation. But if the connections between cause and effect are based upon human inference, how can we be sure that there is any uniformity of natural causes without exception? It would be inconsistent to hold that there is a uniformity of natural causes if there is no necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Even if we were to infer such a uniformity on the basis of observation, it would be based only upon a very small percentage of all observed phenomena. Is it safe to infer complete uniformity if our collective observation is extremely limited?
Another argument that Hume uses against miracles is as follows:
They are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors.3
If Hume is correct, then how does he explain the fact that the Roman Empire in the first three centuries was neither barbarous nor ignorant, yet gave rise to a widespread belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the other miracles believed by Christians? He writes that a miracle:
has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge.4
If this is so, then why did Christianity first succeed in one of the most highly developed cultures in all of history?
Hume argues that one should be dependent upon past observation in evaluating whether miracles are possible. Yet Hume discounts all observations of past miracles in his amassing of past experience. He enumerates many observations of past miracles, but does not consider them to be part of the evidence based upon past experience. It would be as though one argued that lunar eclipses could not occur because our observation of the moon is such that it does not happen. All observations to the contrary are inconsistent with "universal" experience. Such an argument merely assumes the conclusion it seeks to prove. Because Hume's arguments against miracles merely assume the conclusions that he draws, he only begs the question without demonstrating his point.
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Richard Wollheim, Hume on Religion (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 210-211.
2 Ibid., p. 206.
3 Ibid., p. 215.
4 Ibid., p. 216.
